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A fuzzy extractor is a security primitive that allows for reproducible extraction
of an almost uniform key from a non-uniform noisy source. We analyze a fuzzy
extractor scheme that uses universal hash functions for both information recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification. This is a useful scheme when the number of
error patterns likely to occur is limited, regardless of the error probabilities. We
derive a sharp bound on the uniformity of the extracted key, making use of the
concatenation property of universal hash functions and a recent tight formulation
of the leftover hash lemma.
Many security applications require input bitstrings to be uniformly distributed
and exactly reproducible. Physical sources of randomness, such as biometrics and
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), however, are neither uniform nor noise-
free. For security/privacy reasons it is often necessary to apply a one-way hash
function to the biometric/PUF measurement, in analogy with the /etc/passwd
file in UNIX. The storage of biometric data is assumed to be public; the hashing
step hides the measurement data. However, as measurements are noisy, it is not
possible to directly hash; a single bit error in the input causes roughly 50% of
the output bits to flip. Hence, an error-correction step is required first. This is
not trivial, since the redundancy data has to be stored publicly and may reveal
too much sensitive information. Similarly, a key derived from a PUF should be
thoroughly noise-corrected first. Here, too, it is crucial that the publicly stored
redundancy data does not reveal secrets. After information reconciliation, the
step of privacy amplification is applied, mapping a non-uniform random string
to a shorter, almost uniform string. The requirement of uniformity is obvious
in the case of key extraction. Interestingly, extracting uniform bitstrings is also
desirable in biometric systems and PUF-based anti-counterfeiting, applications
where the identifiers are not considered to be secret. A uniform string is the
most efficient way of storing the entropy present in a measurement. Furthermore,
database search speed is improved. The concept of a Fuzzy Extractor was intro-
duced as a primitive that achieves both information reconciliation and privacy
amplification. The publicly stored enrolment data W suffices to reproducibly
reconstruct a string S from noisy measurements X ′, yet leaks only a negligible
amount of information about the extracted key S.
One of the nontrivial aspects of the information reconciliation step is the ‘shape’
of the noise. Noise patterns are not always nicely compatible with a binary
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 09282 
Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware 
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2409
representation. Error-correcting codes (ECCs) work best under the condition
that the likely to occur error patterns are completely random. For biometrics
and PUFs, this assumption on the error patterns does not hold, due to various
properties of the sources and the applied discretization methods. Typical ECCs
are not able to capitalize on the low entropy of the errors, since they must be
able to correct the ‘worst case’; consequently a large part of the entropy present
in the source gets wasted. Furthermore, ECCs can approach the Shannon bound
only when the code words are very long. The challenge is to construct a practical
error correction method that, in the case of very non-uniform noise probabilities,
extracts more information than typical ECCs.
We analyze a fuzzy extractor based on a specific form of Slepian-Wolf coding
which employs (almost-)universal hash functions. Three such hash functions are
applied to the source X, to produce the secret string S, the helper data W , and
a MAC key V which is used to authenticate the helper data. W and S can be
considered to be part of the same big hash value. If this is taken literally, then
it can be said that the scheme performs information reconciliation and privacy
amplification at the same time or even in the opposite order compared to other
schemes. The scheme is efficient if the number of likely-to-occur error patterns
is limited; computation of short universal hashes is very fast.
We derive a sharp bound on the uniformity of the extracted key. If the string
lengths c, k, σ satisfy
c ≤ max
ρ
[
Hρ2(X) + 2− log
1
ε(ε− ρ)− δ/4
]
− k − σ
then the statistical distance between the key S and the uniform distribution
(given that the attacker has seen W and the MAC) is smaller than ε. In the
above equation, ρ is a ‘smoothing’ parameter, Hρ2(X) is the smooth Re´nyi entropy
of order 2, and δ is a parameter derived from the ‘almost-ness’ of the employed
almost-universal hash functions.
Finally we argue that the scheme can be implemented efficiently.
